The Berlin Airlift Crisis of 1948 brought together President Truman and his advisors to discuss the possibility of using nuclear weapons in World War III, and revealed the dilemma of using them as a bluff or actually using them to deter the other side.
The years 1945 and 1946 saw unique ideas proposed to eliminate atomic weapons from the world, but war plans acknowledge the need for an atomic initiative if there is a danger to allies or necessary assets.
Public figures' beliefs can be multi-layered, and history can compress their lives into one-dimensional figures. Author Evan Thomas adds another layer to the already complex former president Eisenhower in his book "Ike's Bluff," by highlighting Eisenhower's love of strategy card games.
Truman deserves credit for avoiding the bombing of any country with nuclear weapons during his term in office. He played a crucial role in laying down the rules for the three-dimensional geopolitical game of nuclear chess played globally and helped cobble together a way to deal with the increasing threat, despite the destabilizing effects of ever-increasing technological advancements.
The Kennedy administration's famous change to the US national security strategy was called flexible response, where they would use nuclear weapons if necessary but not lead with them, marking a significant transition from Eisenhower's massive retaliation approach. This strategy was more for public relations than reality on the ground, and it was a response to the Soviet Union bluffing with nuclear weapon capabilities that they didn't possess.
In this podcast episode, the speaker reflects on the immense power held by American presidents, with particular focus on Harry Truman's role during the Korean War. Truman was the first man in human history to have the responsibility of making critical decisions about the use of atomic bombs in war, reflecting a level of power and influence that is hard to comprehend.